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have gathered here a collection of papers at a point of intersection
of mind. The essays in this
and the philosophy
between
epistemology
collection
illuminate the bearing of issues about rationality on a variety
of themes about belief, including the relation of belief to other proposi
the nature
the nature of the subjects who have beliefs,
tional attitudes,
of the objects of belief, and the ways in which we attribute content to

We

beliefs.
in his contribution,
defends a general
For example, Richard Foley,
view about the nature of rationality which, he argues, applies to belief
a decision,
as a special case.1 According
to his general conception,
it
will
is
rational
etc.,
if,
belief,
roughly speaking,
apparently
plan, goal,
satisfy the agent's goals. This suggests that there might be good reasons
not reasons to think that the proposi
for belief which are nevertheless
is true is only one among
tion believed
is true, since believing what
many goals we have, and believing what is false, or anyway that for
which we lack adequate
evidence, may be a way of satisfying some of
our other goals. Foley agrees that good reasons for belief need not be
reasons

to think the belief true, but argues that the consequences
of
this view are less radical than they might
seem; in general, believing
is the best way to win the
that for which we have the best evidence
which
result
from
benefits
might
holding a particular belief.
pragmatic
seem beneficial
to believe
In many cases in which
it might
something
the pragmatic
for which one has inadequate
evidence, Foley contends,
in question can be gained by epistemic attitudes of acceptance
benefits
or hypothesizing
the
that fall short of belief,
such as, presupposing
in question
rather than believing
that proposi
truth of the proposition
view has implications
for the philos
tion. Thus, Foley's epistemological
ophy of mind, since his notion of rationality requires a sharp distinction
in the philosophy
of mind between belief and acceptance.
of
rationality also relate in various ways to views about
Conceptions
in part of
the content of belief. On some views rationality
consists
procedures

?

one

ought

to follow
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belief that cannot possibly be true.2 Such a view of rationality would
to
not fit well with an account of the objects of the attitudes according
one
the impossible.
could
which one simply could not believe
(Perhaps
beliefs. But on
for dealing with conflicting
simply shift to procedures
even genuinely
some views of the attitudes,
conflicting beliefs are im
a
a
clashes with accounts
such
view
related
Also,
point,
possible.3)
one
and
all the
to
which
inevitably believes
automatically
according
one
case
one
in
since
that
of
believes,
consequences
necessary
things
who believed
everything,
thereby believe
something
impossible would
and it is hard to see what epistemological
principles would
help to
led to believing
correct that situation. If believing
the impossible merely
one might envision a principle
beliefs which
for eliminating
everything,
a
But
such
further
beliefs.
in
of
principle will be of
erupt
explosions
little use if to believe something
impossible just is to believe everything.
And some influential views about the objects of belief appear to have
as Stalnaker notes at the begin
For example,
just such consequences.
and
doxastic
of
his
contribution,
logics have been mod
ning
epistemic
to
to necessity.
be
with
taken
belief
eled on modal
analogous
logic,
to
normal
modal
mirror
have
tended
logics in the
logics
Epistemic
a
of P, then
if
is
deductive
Q
consequence
respect: just as,
following
a
of
deductive
is
P", so if
consequence
g"
"Necessarily
"Necessarily
or
a
then
"S
knows
"5
believes
of
is
deductive
P,
g"
consequence
g
or "S
a
P"
to
knows
be
of
"S
deductive
is
taken
consequence
g"
that one knows or
believes P". Such logics thus have the consequence
of things one knows or believes.
believes all the deductive
consequences
It is worth adding that something
very similar to the view that one
is
of the things one believes
all the deductive
believes
consequences
some
an almost unavoidable
held
views
about
of
consequence
widely
as Scott Soames has shown.4 It seems indisputable
that belief
over conjunction,
that P & g, then
that is, that if I believe
as it is tempting
that g. Now
I believe
that P and I believe
suppose,
that grass is green"
to do, that "Ralph believes
reports a relation
content
is
of
semantic
and
the
between Ralph
"grass
green". Suppose
as the
finally that the semantic content of "grass is green" is construed
- for
true
that
is
set of conditions
in which "grass is green"
example,
set
worlds
is the
of possible
the semantic content of "grass is green"
in which grass is green is
in which grass is green.5 The set of worlds
in which grass is green and 29 = 512; so,
the same as the set of worlds
semantics,
distributes
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is true, so is "Ralph believes
if "Ralph believes
that grass is green"
=
that grass is green and 29
512". But if belief distributes over conjunc
we
have the result that "Ralph believes
that 29 = 512" is
tion, then
true. The argument
If
is perfectly general.
that the sky
"Helga believes
that either the sky is not
is blue" is true, then so are "Helga believes
colorless or all French citizens are aliens from Saturn", "Helga believes
that the sky is not colorless and either the sky is not a solid red dot or
etc. If we accept the argument's premis
it is a solid orange pumpkin",
one
it
believes
of things one
shows
that
ses,
consequence
any necessary
even without
over
the view that belief distributes
Moreover,
we
one
shall
the
view
that
believes anything necessarily
get
conjunction,
as Stalnaker notes,
to things one believes;
this is already
equivalent
a
strong view.
quite

believes.

all the necessary
it seems hard to deny, we do not believe
of our beliefs; we are not logically omniscient.
consequences
Logics or
we
are
accounts of semantics
to which
according
logically omniscient
can at best be idealizations.
In his paper, Stalnaker discusses
the nature
or belief,
involved. Normal
of the idealization
logics of knowledge
are
as
not
best thought of
Stalnaker
argues,
logics of the beliefs of
to the
beings;
they are better
thought of as applying
hyper-rational
a
or
sense
beliefs of ordinary agents, but in special
technical
of 'belief.
to a sort of implicit belief which
is not the
They apply, he suggests,
ordinary sort of belief. If I believe P, then I implicitly believe anything
to gain
implied by P, even though I may find it difficult or impossible
access to this implicit information.
an account of the logic of belief which
Stalnaker,
then, defends
we
believe
(at least in a technical sense of the term) all
implies that
the necessary consequences
of our beliefs, despite the apparent conflict
between
this view and natural views of rationality.
Similarly, but for
different reasons, Ruth Barcan Marcus has defended
the view that one
cannot believe
the impossible.6 Her reasons have to do directly with
But,

the relation between
and belief:
she holds that ascribing
rationality
to a rational agent would
in the impossible
render the agent's
a
behavior
from
that
of
irrational agent.7
indistinguishable
genuinely
In his contribution
to this volume, Curtis Brown defends the possibility
of believing what is not possible against Marcus's
arguments,
suggesting
that if her argument were sound it would
lead to much more drastic
belief

consequences

than

she

intends.

But

Brown

adds

that

if there

is a
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our
subclass of the objects of our belief which essentially
characterize
narrow or intrinsic mental
we
cannot
Marcus's
claim
that
believe
states,
the impossible will be true of them.
and Brown's papers,
Stalnaker's
then, concern the relation between
content.
and
the
attribution
of
So, in a very different way,
rationality
the paper of R. M. Sainsbury.8
One of the main problems
of
we
are
of
what
in
is
the
believ
rationally justified
epistemology
problem
of which epistemologists
ing, and one of the main devices by means

does

have pursued this problem
is the thought-experiment
of the evil genius
our thoughts and experiences
who produces
in such a way that our
beliefs are radically false. The evil genius scenario has interesting con
nections with views about the contents of the attitudes. For example,
an influential argument
that causal views
Hilary Putnam9 has produced
about the content of the attitudes render the skeptical scenario incoher
ent. A very different
to a similar
from similar premisses
argument
an
In his contri
conclusion may be found in
essay of John McDowell.10
in detail the bearing of Russellian
views of
bution, Sainsbury explores
to which content is not entirely intrinsic, on various
content, according
He agrees that Russellian
views of content are
skeptical possibilities.
a
with
naive version of the Cartesian
scenario,
skeptical
incompatible
that there are more
Cartesian
but argues
sophisticated
possibilities
which Russellianism
will not dislodge. Nevertheless,
these more sophis
on
states
the notion that mental
with different
ticated possibilities
rely
and Sainsbury
leaves
contents may be "indistinguishable
from within",
an
is
it
this notion
sustainable.
open question whether
ultimately
to this volume,
that of Laurence
Another
contribution
BonJour,
issues and the nature of
addresses
the relation between
epistemological
at least some elements of
to BonJour,
the objects of belief. According
must
content
have
virtue
of
their
intrinsic character rather
by
thought
to other thoughts or to the outside
than by virtue of their relations
claim that there are objects of belief
(This is similar to Brown's
rea
which characterize
one's intrinsic mental
states, though BonJour's
a
sons for the claim are different.)
BonJour
view
argues that only such
access to the content of our thoughts. He
can explain our introspective
criticizes
the view that the objects of thought are essentially
symbolic

world.

access. His
or linguistic as being incompatible
with such introspective
is simple: if the objects of thought are linguistic,
then
basic argument
their content is not determined
but, rather,
by their intrinsic properties
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in some way by the relations in which they stand, for example relations
to the external objects by which
they are caused under normal con
or
use the same
to
others
in the community
relations
the
ditions,
way
are
not
But
these
relations
observable.
So it
symbols.
introspectively
seem that content
is not introspectively
All that is
would
observable.
so all that could be
to consciousness
in thinking
is symbols,
present
a
one
to
the content of a
consciousness
when
has
belief
about
present
is symbols.11
particular expression
two
BonJour
First, one
rejects
possible
replies to this argument.
content
not
to
hold
is
in
head
that
the
is
inaccessible
and, thus,
might
no
so
to
it
is
view
it
the
that
objection
linguistic
implies
introspection,12
is that even if
that content cannot be introspected.
BonJour's
response
a certain dimension
to introspection,
is inaccessible
of content
many
For instance,
that 'water' refers to
aspects of content are accessible.
some
to
be
inaccessible
H20 may
English speakers, but it is nevertheless
to them that water is "the locally familiar liquid that appears
accessible
in lakes and rivers, falls from the sky at times", and so on. (BonJour
content
identifies
the distinction
between
accessible
and inaccessible
with the distinction
"wide" and "narrow" content.)
between
Second,
some version of "conceptual
BonJour
idea
that
role seman
the
rejects
tics" can account for the content of the language of thought in a way
which makes
these contents
available.
introspectively
Pears
takes up issues about the relation between
Finally, David
nature
and
the
of the subjects of belief. A particularly
inter
rationality
sort
is
the
of
in an
of
esting
irrationality
phenomenon
self-deception;
an account of self-deception
earlier work,13 Pears defended
according
to which
centers of agency. On such a view,
it involves sub-personal
entities can also
people are not the only subjects of belief; sub-personal
In
to the
have beliefs,
and
other
attitudes.
his
contribution
goals,
nature
Pears
addresses
the
of
these
enti
present volume,
sub-personal
the nature of the contrast between his view that they
ties by exploring
are centers of agency and Davidson's
view that, while there are indeed
are
not
centers
of
agency. Pears goes on to evaluate
sub-systems,
they
Mark Johnston's
claim that the account of self-deception
in terms of
Pears suggests that, while
the sub
agents is incoherent.
sub-personal
some
he
invokes
lack
of
the
features
of
intentional
systems
ordinary
it plausible
that
agency,
they retain enough of those features to make
are
centers
indeed
of
agency.
they
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